John Bedini has died 
Συνεννόηση για Δράση  Απόψεις  
Συντάχθηκε απο τον/την Χρήστος Μπούμπουλης (Christos Boumpoulis)  
Τετάρτη, 21 Οκτώβριος 2020 13:28  
The REAL Rife Machine by John Bedini  Bedini RPX
www.youtube.com/watch?v=whfg6omn_c
2 ALTERNATIVE Energy & Medical Researchers have died, John and Gary Bedini
www.youtube.com/watch?v=bB5yEk45js
Bedini RPX Sideband Generator  How to set it up
www.youtube.com/watch?v=pDkQBSH7iN0
Mad Max: Fury Road (2015)  Chase moves on (2/10) [4K]
www.youtube.com/watch?v=59b6mQmkBTA
John Bedini has died
To the best of my knowledge, there was no "foul play" associated with John's death. His brother Gary had been undergoing treatments for throat cancer for the last two months, and John was quite stressed about that. He had done everything he knew how to do to help his brother get through this illness. By the time all of his treatments were done, Gary was cancerfree but quite weak. While still in the hospital, nursing staff helping him get out of bed to go to physical therapy dropped him by mistake. The fall broke his pelvis. At that point, Gary's condition went down hill very rapidly. Source: https://www.overunity.com/16965/johnbedinihasdied/
When settlercolonialism is being perpetrated during a supposed peacetime, it relies on the principle of the “plausible deniability” and oppression. Oppression aims towards maintaining collective fear. The archaic fear of death rises collectively when epidemics of lethal diseases are being manifesting. Therefore, during a supposed peacetime, the perpetrators of settlercolonialism they have corresponding motives, to covertly cause lethal (but controllable) epidemics (i.e. genocide) within a targeted population and, to exterminate each and every nonstupid member of this population.
I do not always curry in my hand an activated video recorder. Consequently, I can prove less facts than those that I do know of. Consequently, I can publicize less facts than those that I do know of. However, I am in a position to, under a certain degree of statistical trust, estimate that, even if people, like myself, we succeed in making cancer (and aids, hepatitis, Alzheimer, cardiovascular diseases, ms, etc.) to vanish, due to effective medicalprotocols, as far as the contemporary settlercolonialism persists, then, the global mortality due to (new) diseases shall probably remain, more or less, the same. Concluding, it seems to me that, the combination of, peace, freedom, cooperation, and frugal prosperity, remains mutually excluding with the settlercolonialism.
Christos Boumpoulis evonomist
P.S.: It might not be a bad idea at all that, the nonstupid members of the targeted populations to be promptly rescued by the populations themselves.
Appendix
Incompleteness and provability logic December 14, 2017. Studying Gödel’s theorems in their original arithmetic context involves a lot of detail and hard work if all you are interested in is the logical content (e.g. Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems). I talk about an alternative called provability logic, which cleanly extracts all the interesting logical behaviour. In this context, Gödel’s results reduce to a single logical axiom called Löb’s Theorem and the existence of certain propositional fixed points.
Introduction Prerequisites: propositional logic, some exposure to modal logic.
Gödel’s famous First Incompleteness Theorem hinges on the fact that a sufficiently expressive formal system (like ordinary arithmetic) can be jerryrigged to make statements which are true but not provable. The basic idea: give statements labels so you can refer to them, and a way of talking about provability. Then combine them to make a sentence which says
I am not provable.
More accurately, we would construct a sentence L (for “liar”) which says
Statement L is not provable.
If the formal system is consistent — it can’t prove false statements — then it cannot prove L, since if L was provable, the sentence would be false. This means L must be true! A formal system which cannot prove all the statements about it that are true is called incomplete. So, the First Incompleteness Theorem just states that consistent systems which can refer to themselves, and make statements about provability, must be incomplete.
The Second Incompleteness Theorem is a sort of converse. It turns out that if a system can prove it is consistent, then this must be false: the system will be inconsistent! So, there is a statement in the system which is false but provable, as opposed to true but unprovable. To move beyond these highconcept summaries, usually one takes a course in mathematical logic and learns how to do elaborate and terrible things to basic arithmetic. But if you all you care about is the logical properties of provability, there is an easier way!
Expressing provability Enter modal logic, a type of philosophical logic designed to handle possibility, necessity, and other modal notions of natural language. More recently, it was discovered that modal logic is perfectly adapted to treat provability, giving a clean and elegant characterisation of Gödel’s Theorems, and deeper insights into provability in formal systems. The goal of this post to explain how. I’m going to assume you know propositional logic and a little modal logic, though we won’t need much of the latter.
First, we need some way of expressing the provability of a statement. If p is a statement, e.g. ‘‘1+1=2”, then let □p be the statement “p is provable”. We call □ the provability predicate, since it acts like an adjective applied to the sentence p. More formally, it is an operator which takes a proposition and returns a proposition, or a propositional operator. Now, we could be thinking about provability in a particular formal system, like Peano arithmetic. I will explain what this is below. But the nice thing about logic is that it frees us from the messy details of any particular system and lets us focus on deductive relations instead.
For the time being, we just fix a formal system F, with some semantics (a notion of what statements are true in the system) and a syntax (a way of proving statements in the system). If p is true (from the semantics), we write F⊨p. If we can prove p (from the syntax), we write F⊢p. (We usually omit F.) We call F sound if F⊢p implies F⊨p, and complete if F⊨p implies F⊢p. Gödel’s theorems show that ⊢p, ⊢□p and ⊨□p are distinct but related in interesting ways!
To illustrate, suppose I want to say that F is inconsistent. By definition, that means that F can prove something false. We let ⊥ denote falsum, a logical constant which always evaluates to false; if you prefer, choose a particular contradiction, e.g. ⊥=p∧¬p. (Its partner is the constant true, or verum, ⊤.) So F is inconsistent iff we can prove a falsehood,
□⊥. Now we can easily state Gödel’s Theorems. The First Theorem means that, for some statement p, we have ⊨p∧¬□p, i.e. p is true but not provable. The second says
□¬□⊥→□⊥. If you can prove you’re consistent, you must be lying! Source: https://hapax.github.io/mathematics/logic/philosophy/provability/


Τελευταία Ενημέρωση στις Τετάρτη, 21 Οκτώβριος 2020 13:32 