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Έλληνες, στο έλεος...

 

Harvester's log 16/3/17

 

 

Legal Notice 66

 

Execrable

 

Legal Notice 62

 

  

My story

 

  

Aggression?

 

  

Η Εστία μου

 

  

Why so untidy?

 

  

Αποικιοκρατία

 

  

Εξόντωση Ελλήνων αντιφρονούντων;

 

  

Ζήτημα εμπιστοσύνης

 

  

Μεθοδικότητα

 

  

Ανοικτή Επιστολή πρέσβη ΗΠΑ

Αφορμή, U2RIT vs Ελλάδα;

Βιοηθική

A request to U2RIT

Colonial aggression - 2

Open Letter to UN S.G.

Open Letter to p.C. & p. O.

Δήλωση πρόθεσης επαναπατρισμού

 

Ο "εφιάλτης" της Νυρεμβέργης

Συλλογή Φωτογραφιών

Αίτημα προστασίας, προς Ιταλία

Chroma key, background removal

Science and Ethics

Να συμβάλει και η U2RIT

Θα ξαναφτιάξουν πολλές φορές Άουσβιτς και Zyclon B

 

Split-Screen effect

Η Ζωή είναι Ωραία.

Βόρεια Κορέα

Λευτεριά στους Έλληνες, εξανα- γκαστικά "Εξαφανισμένους"

 

Μυστικές δίκες;

Trustworthiness

Πολιτισμό, ή, απληστία;

Ακραία Στυγνότητα

Η Τέχνη της Επιβίωσης

Political Asylum 3

Επιστροφή στις ρίζες

The Human Cost of Torture

An urgent appeal for solidarity

More obvious than the Sun

Western "culture"

Political Asylum

Έννομη Προστασία

Μια μήνυση που εγείρει ερωτηματικά

 

 

 

Honor your father...

Noise

Creative Greeks

A pair of Dictatorships

Leaders of unlawful combatants and mercenaries PDF Εκτύπωση E-mail
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Συνεννόηση για Διαφύλαξη - Απόψεις
Συντάχθηκε απο τον/την Χρήστος Μπούμπουλης (Christos Boumpoulis)   
Κυριακή, 11 Δεκέμβριος 2016 01:11
Leaders of unlawful combatants and mercenaries
A "leader" is a leader if he remains a Leader.
As with everything else, in life, leadership has hers boundaries.
If, a leader crosses those boundaries, then, he ceases being a leader and becomes something else. That something else, depends upon, the direction and the extent, of the boundary's crossing.
The consequences of being a "follower" depend, also, from the properties of the one who is being followed.
The choice of following, a good leader, or, a not good leader, or, a non leader, may has a devastating impact upon the quality of the follower's own life.
 
Christos Boumpoulis
economist
 
P.S.: I condemn all kinds of violence
 
Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons
The Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Protocol IV of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, was issued by the United Nations on 13 October 1995.[1] It came into force on 30 July 1998.[1] As of the end of April 2016, the protocol had been agreed to by 107 states.[1]
History
The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and three annexed protocols were adopted on 10 October 1980 and opened for signature on 10 April 1981.[2] In 1986, Sweden and Switzerland pushed for the Blinding Laser Protocol.[3] During 1989–91, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) held four international meetings of experts on the topic and in 1993 published Blinding Weapons.[3]
Protocol text
Article 1
It is prohibited to employ laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices. The High Contracting Parties shall not transfer such weapons to any State or non-State entity.
Article 2
In the employment of laser systems, the High Contracting Parties shall take all feasible precautions to avoid the incidence of permanent blindness to unenhanced vision. Such precautions shall include training of their armed forces and other practical measures.
Article 3
Blinding as an incidental or collateral effect of the legitimate military employment of laser systems, including laser systems used against optical equipment, is not covered by the prohibition of this Protocol.
Article 4
For the purpose of this protocol "permanent blindness" means irreversible and uncorrectable loss of vision which is seriously disabling with no prospect of recovery. Serious disability is equivalent to visual acuity of less than 20/200 Snellen measured using both eyes.
Historical significance
ICRC welcomed the ban on blinding lasers as "a significant breakthrough in international humanitarian law," adding:[3]
The prohibition, in advance, of the use of an abhorrent new weapon the production and proliferation of which appeared imminent is an historic step for humanity. It represents the first time since 1868, when the use of exploding bullets was banned, that a weapon of military interest has been banned before its use on the battlefield and before a stream of victims gave visible proof of its tragic effects.
This was also the first international agreement regulating use of lasers during war.[4] (Use of lasers during peace had been previously mentioned in Article IV of the US-Soviet Union Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities Agreement of 1989.)[4]
Limitations
The Protocol does not prohibit attacks against binoculars, periscopes, telescopes, and other optical equipment because it was unknown whether laser attacks on such devices could cause permanent blindness.[4] Article 3 allows for attacks on electronic optical equipment, because damaging it would not cause human injury.[4]
Ophthalmologist John Marshall argues that despite the Protocol's ban, countries continue to develop and use "rangefinders, target illuminators, and anti-sensor systems" that "are still effectively antipersonnel laser weapons" because these technologies have the potential to be employed against people in addition to their intended uses. For example, "a laser system that will dazzle at one mile away may permanently blind at closer range."[5] The only way to prevent all possible eye injuries by combat lasers would be to ban such lasers,[citation needed] but the countries negotiating the Protocol saw this as neither feasible militarily nor even desirable from a humanitarian standpoint because target-marking and rangefinding lasers are important for keeping munitions on target and away from civilians.[4]
[Wiki]
 
Unlawful combatant
An unlawful combatant, illegal combatant or unprivileged combatant/belligerent is a person who directly engages in armed conflict in violation of the laws of war. An unlawful combatant may be detained or prosecuted under the domestic law of the detaining state for such action, subject of course to international treaties on justice and human rights.[1]
Capture of a Franc-Tireur, by Carl Johann Lasch.
The Geneva Conventions apply in wars between two or more sovereign states. Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention states that the status of a detainee may be determined by a "competent tribunal". Until such time, he must be treated as a prisoner of war.[2] After a "competent tribunal" has determined that an individual detainee is an unlawful combatant, the "detaining power" may choose to accord the detained unlawful combatant the rights and privileges of a prisoner of war as described in the Third Geneva Convention, but is not required to do so. An unlawful combatant who is not a national of a neutral state, and who is not a national of a co-belligerent state, retains rights and privileges under the Fourth Geneva Convention so that he must be "treated with humanity and, in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial".[3]
While the concept of an unlawful combatant is included in the Third Geneva Convention, the phrase itself does not appear in the document.[1] Article 4 of Third Geneva Convention does describe categories under which a person may be entitled to POW status, and there are other international treaties that deny lawful combatant status for mercenaries and children. In the United States, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 codified the legal definition of this term and invested the U.S. President with broad discretion to determine whether a person may be designated an unlawful enemy combatant under United States law. The assumption that such a category as unlawful combatant exists is not contradicted by the findings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Celebici Judgment. The judgment quoted the 1958 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention: Every person in enemy hands must be either a prisoner of war and, as such, be covered by the Third Convention; or a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention. Furthermore, "There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law",[4] because in the opinion of the ICRC, "If civilians directly engage in hostilities, they are considered 'unlawful' or 'unprivileged' combatants or belligerents (the treaties of humanitarian law do not expressly contain these terms). They may be prosecuted under the domestic law of the detaining state for such action".[1][5]
Camp X-ray, Guantánamo.
The Geneva Conventions do not recognize any lawful status for combatants in conflicts not involving two or more nation states. A state in such a conflict is legally bound only to observe Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and may ignore all the other Articles. But each one of them is completely free to apply all or part of the remaining Articles of the Convention.[6]
[Wiki]
 
Mercenary
Mercenary[1] takes part in an armed conflict whom is not a national or party to a conflict and is "motivated to take part in the hostilities by desire for private gain".[2][3] Mercenaries fight for money or other recompense instead of fighting for ideological interests, whether they agree with or are against the existing government. In the last century, and as reflected in the Geneva Convention, mercenaries have increasingly come to be seen as less entitled to protections by rules of war than non-mercenaries. However, whether or not a person is a mercenary may be a matter of degree, as financial and national interests may overlap.
Laws of war
See also: Laws of war, Privateer, Letter of marque, and Private military company
Protocol Additional GC 1977 (APGC77) is a 1977 amendment protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Article 47 of the protocol provides the most widely accepted international definition of a mercenary, though not endorsed by some countries, including the United States. The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 states:
Art 47. Mercenaries
1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.
2. A mercenary is any person who:
(a) is especially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.
All the criteria (a – f) must be met, according to the Geneva Convention, for a combatant to be described as a mercenary.
According to the GC III, a captured soldier must be treated as a lawful combatant and, therefore, as a protected person with prisoner-of-war status until facing a competent tribunal (GC III Art 5). That tribunal, using criteria in APGC77 or some equivalent domestic law, may decide that the soldier is a mercenary. At that juncture, the mercenary soldier becomes an unlawful combatant but still must be "treated with humanity and, in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial", being still covered by GC IV Art 5. The only possible exception to GC IV Art 5 is when he is a national of the authority imprisoning him, in which case he would not be a mercenary soldier as defined in APGC77 Art 47.d.
If, after a regular trial, a captured soldier is found to be a mercenary, then he can expect treatment as a common criminal and may face execution. As mercenary soldiers may not qualify as PoWs, they cannot expect repatriation at war's end. The best known post-World War II example of this was on 28 June 1976 when, at the end of the Luanda Trial, an Angolan court sentenced three Britons and an American to death and nine other mercenaries to prison terms ranging from 16 to 30 years. The four mercenaries sentenced to death were shot by a firing squad on 10 July 1976.[4]
The legal status of civilian contractors depends upon the nature of their work and their nationalities with respect to that of the combatants. If they have not "in fact, taken a direct part in the hostilities" (APGC77 Art 47.b), they are not mercenaries but civilians who have non-combat support roles and are entitled to protection under the Third Geneva Convention (GCIII 4.1.4).
On 4 December 1989, the United Nations passed resolution 44/34, the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. It entered into force on 20 October 2001 and is usually known as the UN Mercenary Convention.[5] Article 1 contains the definition of a mercenary. Article 1.1 is similar to Article 47 of Protocol I, however Article 1.2 broadens the definition to include a non-national recruited to overthrow a "Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State; or Undermin[e] the territorial integrity of a State;" and "Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of material compensation..." – under Article 1.2 a person does not have to take a direct part in the hostilities in a planned coup d'état to be a mercenary.
Critics have argued that the convention and APGC77 Art. 47 are designed to cover the activities of mercenaries in post-colonial Africa and do not address adequately the use of private military companies (PMCs) by sovereign states.[6]
The situation during the Iraq War and the continuing occupation of Iraq after the United Nations Security Council-sanctioned hand-over of power to the Iraqi government shows the difficulty of defining a mercenary soldier. While the United States governed Iraq, no U.S. citizen working as an armed guard could be classified as a mercenary because he was a national of a Party to the conflict (APGC77 Art 47.d). With the hand-over of power to the Iraqi government, if one does not consider the coalition forces to be continuing parties to the conflict in Iraq, but that their soldiers are "sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces" (APGC77 Art 47.f), then, unless U.S. citizens working as armed guards are lawfully certified residents of Iraq, i.e., "a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict" (APGC77 Art 47.d), and they are involved with a fire-fight in the continuing conflict, they are mercenary soldiers. However, those who acknowledge the United States and other coalition forces as continuing parties to the conflict might insist that U.S. armed guards cannot be called mercenaries (APGC77 Art 47.d).
[Wiki]
 
Leadership
Leadership is both a research area and a practical skill encompassing the ability of an individual or organization to "lead" or guide other individuals, teams, or entire organizations. The literature debates various viewpoints: contrasting Eastern and Western approaches to leadership, and also (within the West) US vs. European approaches. US academic environments define leadership as "a process of social influence in which a person can enlist the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a common task".[1][2] Leadership seen from a European and non-academic perspective encompasses a view of a leader who can be moved not only by communitarian goals but also by the search for personal power. In a holistic perspective, as the European researcher Daniele Trevisani highlights: "Leadership is a holistic spectrum that can arise from: (1) higher levels of physical power, need to display power and control others, force superiority, ability to generate fear, or group-member's need for a powerful group protector (Primal Leadership), (2) superior mental energies, superior motivational forces, perceivable in communication and behaviors, lack of fear, courage, determination (Psychoenergetic Leadership), (3) higher abilities in managing the overall picture (Macro-Leadership), (4) higher abilities in specialized tasks (Micro-Leadership), (5) higher ability in managing the execution of a task (Project Leadership), and (6) higher level of values, wisdom, and spirituality (Spiritual Leadership), where any Leader derives its Leadership from a unique mix of one or more of the former factors".[3]
Studies of leadership have produced theories involving traits,[4] situational interaction, function, behavior,[5] power, vision and values,[6] charisma, and intelligence, among others.[2]
[Wiki]