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European Dissidents ALARM

 

Zeppelin: Beyond Gravity

 

Foreign intervention in Greece?

 

Η ανελεύθερη Ελλάδα

 

Η Ελλάδα καταγώγιο;

 

Αν.Επ. Π. Παυλόπουλο

  

Intangible prisons

 

Plausible deniability

 

Images of German w & s

 

Crimes against Humanity

 

"Chimera" - "Bellerophon"

 

pr. Donald Trump

 

  

Legal Notice 87

 

Βδέλλες, αποικιοκρατικές

 

Being a German

 

Legal Notice 84

 

Dirty colonial methods

 

Georgi Markov, BG - KGB

 

Samples of Barbarity

 

Ελλάδα - αποκόλληση

 

Έλληνες, στο έλεος...

 

Harvester's log 16/3/17

 

 

Legal Notice 66

 

Execrable

 

Legal Notice 62

 

  

My story

 

  

Aggression?

 

  

Η Εστία μου

 

  

Why so untidy?

 

  

Αποικιοκρατία

 

  

Εξόντωση Ελλήνων αντιφρονούντων;

 

  

Ζήτημα εμπιστοσύνης

 

  

Μεθοδικότητα

 

  

Ανοικτή Επιστολή πρέσβη ΗΠΑ

Αφορμή, U2RIT vs Ελλάδα;

Βιοηθική

A request to U2RIT

Colonial aggression - 2

Open Letter to UN S.G.

Open Letter to p.C. & p. O.

Δήλωση πρόθεσης επαναπατρισμού

 

Ο "εφιάλτης" της Νυρεμβέργης

Συλλογή Φωτογραφιών

Αίτημα προστασίας, προς Ιταλία

Chroma key, background removal

Science and Ethics

Να συμβάλει και η U2RIT

Θα ξαναφτιάξουν πολλές φορές Άουσβιτς και Zyclon B

 

Split-Screen effect

Η Ζωή είναι Ωραία.

Βόρεια Κορέα

Λευτεριά στους Έλληνες, εξανα- γκαστικά "Εξαφανισμένους"

 

Μυστικές δίκες;

Trustworthiness

Πολιτισμό, ή, απληστία;

Ακραία Στυγνότητα

Η Τέχνη της Επιβίωσης

Political Asylum 3

Επιστροφή στις ρίζες

The Human Cost of Torture

An urgent appeal for solidarity

More obvious than the Sun

Western "culture"

Political Asylum

Έννομη Προστασία

Μια μήνυση που εγείρει ερωτηματικά

 

 

 

Honor your father...

Noise

Creative Greeks

A pair of Dictatorships

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Συντάχθηκε απο τον/την Χρήστος Μπούμπουλης (Christos Boumpoulis)   
Κυριακή, 23 Ιούλιος 2017 19:25

 

Crimes against humanity, in Greece

 

In this article I shall try to prove, as being true, the thesis that, crimes against humanity are, currently, being committed against Greece's population and also, crimes against humanity have, already, been committed, against the same population, in the past.

Thesis

“Political repression and enslavement are, definitely, systematically and deliberately, being committed against the indigenous Greek population, in Greece.

Ethnic dehumanization is, probably, systematically and deliberately, being committed against the indigenous Greek population, in Greece.

Ethnic cleansing is, probably, systematically and deliberately, being committed against the indigenous Greek population which inhabits the prefecture of Evros, in Greece”.

 

During the last, approximately, sixty years, the Greek population has been, and continues to be, repressed by the colonialists, through obstructing the economic exploitation of Greece's enormously wealthy mineral resources, in order, to keep this population under colonial repression and, (as issues risen publicly remain unanswered, with regard to, subtraction of tissues/organs from involuntary live civilians for transplantations and illegal/unethical human experimentations against involuntary civilians – dehumanization) to abuse Greek civilians for tissue/organs smuggling and illegal/unethical human experimentation.

From the year 2010 and then, fragments of information about the colonialists' crimes against Greek civilians started surfacing the public dialog. From that time frame and then, the, heavily influenced by the colonialists, Greek governments, systematically, enlarged, beyond any, rational and/or, ethical, reasoning, the Greece's national debt, thus, lubricating the colonialists methods for transferring the ownership of Greece's private real estate, from the indigenous Greek citizens, to either, various international monetary funds, or, to non-indigenous Greek citizens.

The, illegal and immoral, deprivation of the indigenous Greek citizens' real estate has the following meaning.

Contrary to the official claims about the democratic principles which, allegedly, govern the international relationships, the international practice dictates that, when territorial claims are concerned, what it matters, is not the relative volume of the populations, but, instead, it is the relative volume of the populations' real estate ownership (see the British official studies about Cyprus real estate ownership, see approx 70.000 luxury houses at the occupied part of Cyprus, which were bought by the Russian, see the volume of the real estate and the agriculture land which has been bought, at the prefecture of Evros, in Greece, by, either, Russians, or, in behalf of the Russians).

Also, exclusively, during historical periods, were the human rights are being defied systematically, were inconceivably ruthless mafias, essentially, control, from entire governments, to entire National economy's sectors, there is another aspect of the collective, real estate deprivation. If, a family owns the house in which keeps hers residence, then, she has the legal right and the motive to do whatever is necessary in order to secure that, it is impossible, sensitive personal information with regard to the members of this family, to leak towards illegitimate interested parties. On the contrary, if and when, families stay within rented house which belong to the organized crime, then, the fate of the members of those families may become governed by the ethics which are embedded within the organized crime (e.g. by finding out that, someone of the predecessors of that family suffered from a specific illness, the organized crime could arrange for, one of this family members, to involuntarily contribute to the increase of organized crime's revenues, by spending a part of the family's income for medicine which control the development of the same illness).

Furthermore, in Greece, during the last sixty year and more intensely, after the year 2010, the Greek governments have, immorally and illegitimately, disassociated their choices, with regards to economic issues, like privatization and foreign investments, from their external economies, namely, from the consequences, of those choices, upon, the human rights, the fundamental freedoms, the National sovereignty and the territorial integrity, of the Greek Nation. More specifically, beyond any patriotism and beyond any obedience to the Greek Constitution, those governments supported privatizations and other bilateral, and/or, multilateral, international agreements with interested parties (States, oligarchs, etc.) which are related, with violations of the human rights, and/or, which are active colonialists, and/or, which are remorseless perpetrators of illegitimate/unethical involuntary human experimentations, and/or, which are active violators of the international law, and/or, which are active and illegitimate occupiers of foreign land, and/or, which are systematic abusers of the private economy for promoting their illegitimate colonial interests, etc.

The evident negative consequences, upon, the human rights, the fundamental freedoms, the National sovereignty and the territorial integrity, of the Greek Nation, which originate from the colonialists' evident and illegitimate, colonial influence upon the Greek governments constitute the deliberate, systematic and widespread perpetration of the crimes of, enslavement, political repression and dehumanization.

At the prefecture of Evros, at Greece, a lot of near suspicious deaths manifest.

Greek immigrants which repatriate to Greece, die, immediately after having finished the construction of their new houses, at Evros. Too many people die from cancer, there. Many people which had influential, in terms of gate keeping, businesses, die. And there are some incidents of people which defended their legitimate interests against, probably, various corrupted parts of the States administration and then, died. At the same time, during the extreme economic crisis, there, too many shops and other small businesses are closing and after few days they have been bought by citizens of a neighboring State. Too many agricultural land and other real estate, is being bought, by monetary capital of an obscure origin, and by either, foreign, or, foreign controlled, citizens.

Concluding, from what it seems, the colonialists, during the last sixty years, committed very serious crimes against humanity, in Greece, in order to promote their economic, political and medical interests and from the year 2010, they seemingly, commit additional crimes against humanity, in Greece, in order to deprive Greece's population, from comprehending the commitment of those crimes and from reacting defensively, in order to survive and become liberated.

The international community is consisted by seven and half billion people.

The international community see and comprehend the crimes which, the Greek Nation, is suffering.

The international community remains responsible for hers actions and hers omissions.

The international community, may collect, in the future, the direct and the indirect, consequences of both, hers previous actions, as well as, hers previous omissions.

 

Christos Boumpoulis

economist

 

P.S.: This is a preliminary version of the article. I retain the opportunity to make, shorty, few additions and modifications.

 

 

Appendix

 

The mafia State - Organized Crime Takes Office

By Moisés Naím

The global economic crisis has been a boon for transnational criminals. Thanks to the weak economy, cash-rich criminal organizations can acquire financially distressed but potentially valuable companies at bargain prices. Fiscal austerity is forcing governments everywhere to cut the budgets of law enforcement agencies and court systems. Millions of people have been laid off and are thus more easily tempted to break the law. Large numbers of unemployed experts in finance, accounting, information technology, law, and logistics have boosted the supply of world-class talent available to criminal cartels. Meanwhile, philanthropists all over the world have curtailed their giving, creating funding shortfalls in the arts, education, health care, and other areas, which criminals are all too happy to fill in exchange for political access, social legitimacy, and popular support. International criminals could hardly ask for a more favorable business environment. Their activities are typically high margin and cash-based, which means they often enjoy a high degree of liquidity -- not a bad position to be in during a global credit crunch.

But emboldened adversaries and dwindling resources are not the only problems confronting police departments, prosecutors, and judges. In recent years, a new threat has emerged: the mafia state. Across the globe, criminals have penetrated governments to an unprecedented degree. The reverse has also happened: rather than stamping out powerful gangs, some governments have instead taken over their illegal operations. In mafia states, government officials enrich themselves and their families and friends while exploiting the money, muscle, political influence, and global connections of criminal syndicates to cement and expand their own power. Indeed, top positions in some of the world's most profitable illicit enterprises are no longer filled only by professional criminals; they now include senior government officials, legislators, spy chiefs, heads of police departments, military officers, and, in some extreme cases, even heads of state or their family members.

This fusing of governments and criminal groups is distinct from the more limited ways in which the two have collaborated in the past. Governments and spy agencies, including those of democratic countries, have often enlisted criminals to smuggle weapons to allied insurgents in other countries or even to assassinate enemies abroad. (The CIA's harebrained attempt to enlist American mafia figures to assassinate Fidel Castro in 1960 is perhaps the best-known example.) But unlike normal states, mafia states do not just occasionally rely on criminal groups to advance particular foreign policy goals. In a mafia state, high government officials actually become integral players in, if not the leaders of, criminal enterprises, and the defense and promotion of those enterprises' businesses become official priorities. In mafia states such as Bulgaria, Guinea-Bissau, Montenegro, Myanmar (also called Burma), Ukraine, and Venezuela, the national interest and the interests of organized crime are now inextricably intertwined.

Because the policies and resource allocations of mafia states are determined as much by the influence of criminals as by the forces that typically shape state behavior, these states pose a serious challenge to policymakers and analysts of international politics. Mafia states defy easy categorization, blurring the conceptual line between states and nonstate actors. As a result, their behavior is difficult to predict, making them particularly dangerous actors in the international environment.

 

A REVOLUTION IN CRIME

Conventional wisdom about international criminal networks rests on three faulty assumptions. First, many people believe that when it comes to illicit activities, everything has been done before. It is true that criminals, smugglers, and black markets have always existed. But the nature of international crime has changed a great deal in the past two decades, as criminal networks have expanded beyond their traditional markets and started taking advantage of political and economic transformations and exploiting new technologies. In the early 1990s, for example, criminal groups became early adopters of innovations in communications, such as advanced electronic encryption. Criminal syndicates also pioneered new means of drug transportation, such as "narco-submarines": semi-submersible vessels able to evade radar, sonar, and infrared systems. (Drug cartels in Colombia eventually graduated to fully submersible submarines.) In more recent years, criminal organizations have also taken advantage of the Internet, leading to a dizzying growth in cybercrime, which cost the global economy some $114 billion in 2011, according to the Internet security firm Symantec.

A second common misperception is that international crime is an underground phenomenon that involves only a small community of deviants operating at the margins of societies. The truth is that in many countries, criminals today do not bother staying underground at all, nor are they remotely marginal. In fact, the suspected leaders of many major criminal groups have become celebrities of a sort. Wealthy individuals with suspicious business backgrounds are sought-after philanthropists and have come to control radio and television stations and own influential newspapers. Moreover, criminals' accumulation of wealth and power depends not only on their own illicit activities but also on the actions of average members of society: for example, the millions of citizens involved in China's counterfeit consumer-goods industry and in Afghanistan's drug trade, the millions of Westerners who smoke marijuana regularly, the hundreds of thousands of migrants who every year hire criminals to smuggle them to Europe, and the well-to-do professionals in Manhattan and Milan who employ illegal immigrants as nannies and housekeepers. Ordinary people such as these are an integral part of the criminal ecosystem.

A third mistaken assumption is that international crime is strictly a matter of law enforcement, best managed by police departments, prosecutors, and judges. In reality, international crime is better understood as a political problem with national security implications. The scale and scope of the most powerful criminal organizations now easily match those of the world's largest multinational corporations. And just as legitimate organizations seek political influence, so, too, do criminal ones. Of course, criminals have always sought to corrupt political systems to their own advantage. But illicit groups have never before managed to acquire the degree of political influence now enjoyed by criminals in a wide range of African, eastern European, and Latin American countries, not to mention China and Russia.

In the past decade or so, this phenomenon has crossed a threshold, resulting in the emergence of potent mafia states. José Grinda, a Spanish prosecutor with years of experience fighting eastern European criminal organizations, maintains that in many cases, it has become impossible for him and his colleagues to distinguish the interests of criminal organizations from those of their host governments. According to Grinda, Spanish law enforcement officials constantly confront criminal syndicates that function as appendages of the governments of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. In confidential remarks contained in U.S. diplomatic cables released by the whistleblower Web site WikiLeaks, he detailed his concerns about the "tremendous control" exercised by what he termed "the Russian mafia" over a number of strategic sectors of the global economy, such as aluminum and natural gas. This control, Grinda suggested, is made possible by the extent to which the Kremlin collaborates with Russian criminal organizations.

In mafia states, government officials and criminals often work together through legal business conglomerates with close ties to top leaders and their families and friends. According to Grinda, Moscow regularly employs criminal syndicates -- as when, for example, Russia's military intelligence agency directed a mafia group to supply arms to Kurdish rebels in Turkey. More indicative of the overlap between Russia's government and its criminal groups, however, is the case of a cargo ship, Arctic Sea, that the Russian government claimed was hijacked by pirates off the coast of Sweden in 2009. Moscow ostensibly sent the Russian navy to rescue the ship, but many experts believe it was actually smuggling weapons on behalf of Russia's intelligence services and that the hijacking and rescue were ruses intended to cover up the trafficking after rival intelligence services had disrupted it. Grinda says that the smuggling was a joint operation run by organized criminal gangs and what he cryptically termed "Eurasian security services." The Russians were embarrassed, but the outcome was essentially benign, even a bit comical. Still, the affair underscored the unpredictability of a security environment in which it is difficult to distinguish the geopolitical calculations of states from the profit motives of criminal organizations.

 

"THE MAFIA HAS THE COUNTRY"

Russia is hardly the only country where the line between government agencies and criminal groups has been irreparably blurred. Last year, the Council of Europe published a report alleging that the prime minister of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, and his political allies exert "violent control over the trade in heroin and other narcotics" and occupy important positions in "Kosovo's mafia-like structures of organized crime." The state-crime nexus is perhaps even stronger in Bulgaria. A 2005 U.S. diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks last year is worth quoting at length, given the disturbing portrait it paints of Bulgaria's descent into mafia statehood. The cable read, in part:

Organized crime has a corrupting influence on all Bulgarian institutions, including the government, parliament and judiciary. In an attempt to maintain their influence regardless of who is in power, OC [organized crime] figures donate to all the major political parties. As these figures have expanded into legitimate businesses, they have attempted -- with some success -- to buy their way into the corridors of power. . . . Below the level of the national government and the leadership of the major political parties, OC "owns" a number of municipalities and individual members of parliament. This direct participation in politics -- as opposed to bribery -- is a relatively new development for Bulgarian OC. Similarly in the regional center of Velingrad, OC figures control the municipal council and the mayor's office. Nearly identical scenarios have played out in half a dozen smaller towns and villages across Bulgaria.

This state of affairs led Atanas Atanasov, a member of the Bulgarian parliament and a former counterintelligence chief, to observe that "other countries have the mafia; in Bulgaria the mafia has the country."

Crime and the state are also becoming intertwined in Afghanistan, where top government officials and provincial governors -- including President Hamid Karzai's half brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, who was assassinated last year -- have been accused not just of colluding with drug-trafficking networks but of actually leading them. As the drug trade becomes ever more globalized, African countries have been drawn in, too, becoming important transit points for drugs from the Andean region and Asia on their way to drug-hungry European markets. Inevitably, several African rulers and their families, along with lower-level politicians, military officers, and members of the judiciary, have entered the narcotics-trafficking business themselves. In Guinea, for example, Ousmane Conté, son of the late president Lansana Conté, was officially labeled a "drug kingpin" by the U.S. government in 2010.

Police departments, secret services, courts, local and provincial governments, passport-issuing agencies, and customs offices have all become coveted targets for criminal takeovers. Last year, René Sanabria, a retired general who headed Bolivia's antidrug agency, was arrested by U.S. federal agents in Panama and charged with plotting to ship hundreds of kilograms of cocaine to Miami. Sanabria pled guilty and was sentenced to 14 years in prison. Similarly, a succession of generals who held the chief antidrug post in Mexico are now in prison for taking part in the very kind of crime they were supposed to prevent.

A mafia state has also taken root in Venezuela. In 2010, President Hugo Chávez appointed General Henry Rangel Silva as the top commander of the Venezuelan armed forces; earlier this year, he became minister of defense. But in 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department added Rangel Silva to its list of officially designated drug kingpins, accusing him of "materially assisting narcotic trafficking activities." The Treasury Department also recently slapped that label on a number of other Venezuelan officials, including five high-ranking military officers, a senior intelligence officer, and an influential member of congress allied with Chávez. In 2010, a Venezuelan named Walid Makled, accused by several governments of being the head of one of the world's largest drug-trafficking groups, was captured by Colombian authorities. Prior to his extradition to Venezuela, Makled claimed that he had videos, recorded telephone conversations, canceled checks, and other evidence proving he worked for a criminal network that involved 15 Venezuelan generals (including the head of military intelligence and the director of the antinarcotics office), the brother of the country's interior minister, and five members of congress.

Owing in part to such ties, the cocaine business has flourished in Venezuela in recent years, and the country now supplies more than half of all cocaine shipments to Europe, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. And the drug trade is not the only illicit activity that has flourished in Venezuela's era of state-sanctioned crime: the country has also become a base of operations for human trafficking, money laundering, counterfeiting, weapons smuggling, and the trade in contraband oil.

In the past, foreign policy scholars generally considered international crime to be a relatively minor problem that domestic legal systems should handle. The impact of crime, they believed, was insignificant compared with the threat of terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Fortunately, the conventional wisdom is starting to change. More and more experts and policymakers are recognizing that crime has become a significant source of global instability, especially with the emergence of mafia states.

Criminal gangs, for example, have become involved in for-profit nuclear proliferation. A. Q. Khan, the notorious Pakistani nuclear peddler, claimed that he was spreading bomb-making know-how to other nations in order to advance Pakistan's interests. But the international network he built to market and deliver his goods was organized as an illicit, for-profit enterprise. Nuclear proliferation experts have long cautioned that nonstate actors might not respond to nuclear deterrence strategies in the same way states do; there is reason to worry, then, that as criminal organizations fuse more thoroughly with governments, deterrence might become more difficult. Perhaps most worrisome in this regard is North Korea. Although North Korea recently announced that in exchange for food aid, it would suspend its nuclear weapons tests, stop enriching uranium, and allow international inspectors to visit its main nuclear complex, the country still remains a nuclear-armed dictatorship whose state-directed criminal enterprises have led U.S. officials to nickname it "the Sopranos state." Sheena Chestnut Greitens, an expert on the crime-state nexus in North Korea, has written that the country has "the means and motivation for exporting nuclear material," warning that "proliferation conducted through illicit networks will not always be well controlled by the supplier state," which adds additional uncertainty to an already dangerous situation.

Even putting aside the alarming prospect of nuclear mafia states, governments heavily involved in illicit trade might be more prone to use force when their access to profitable markets is threatened. Take, for example, the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia over the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to the Carnegie Endowment's Thomas de Waal, an expert on the Caucasus, before the conflict, criminal organizations operated highly profitable operations in South Ossetia, where illicit trade accounted for a significant part of the economy. Although direct evidence is difficult to come by, the scale of these illegal activities suggested the active complicity of senior Russian officials, who acted as the criminals' patrons and partners. Of course, the conflict was fueled by many factors, including ethnic strife, domestic Georgian politics, and Russia's desire to assert its hegemony in its near abroad. But it is also conceivable that among the interest groups pushing the Kremlin toward war were those involved in lucrative trafficking operations in the contested areas.

 

PROFITING IN THE SHADOWS

Increasingly, fighting transnational crime must mean more than curbing the traffic of counterfeit goods, drugs, weapons, and people; it must also involve preventing and reversing the criminalization of governments. Illicit trade is intrinsically dangerous, but the threat it poses to society is amplified when criminals become high-level government officials and governments take over criminal syndicates. Yet today's law enforcement agencies are no match for criminal organizations that not only are wealthy, violent, and ruthless but also benefit from the full support of national governments and their diplomats, judges, spies, generals, cabinet ministers, and police chiefs. Mafia states can afford the best lawyers and accountants and have access to the most advanced technology. Underfunded law enforcement agencies, overworked courts, and slow-moving bureaucracies are increasingly unable to keep up with such well-funded, agile foes.

Law enforcement agencies are also hamstrung by the fact that they are inherently national, whereas the largest and most dangerous criminal organizations, along with the agents of mafia states, operate in multiple jurisdictions. Mafia states integrate the speed and flexibility of transnational criminal networks with the legal protections and diplomatic privileges enjoyed only by states, creating a hybrid form of international actor against which domestic law enforcement agencies have few weapons. The existing tools that national governments can use to counter the new threat -- treaties, multilateral organizations, and cooperation among national law enforcement agencies -- are slow, unwieldy, and unsuited to the task. After all, how can a country coordinate its anticrime efforts with government leaders or top police officials who are themselves criminals?

The emergence of mafia states imperils the very concept of international law enforcement cooperation. In 2006, the heads of police of 152 nations met in Brazil for the 75th General Assembly of Interpol, the multilateral organization whose constitution calls on it "to ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities." Interpol's president at the time was Jackie Selebi, the national police commissioner of South Africa. In his opening address, Selebi exhorted his colleagues "to find systems to make sure that our borders and border control are on a firm footing"; a noble cause, to be sure. Unfortunately, its champion turned out to be a crook himself. In 2010, Selebi was convicted of accepting a $156,000 bribe from a drug smuggler and is now serving a 15-year prison sentence.

But more troubling for Interpol than any single high-profile embarrassment is what insiders call a "low-trust problem," which has historically stifled the agency's efforts. "The sad truth is I am not going to share my best, most delicate information with the Russian or Mexican police departments," one senior official in the United Kingdom's organized-crime agency told me when asked about Interpol. Even though the agency goes to great lengths to ensure the confidentiality of the information that its member agencies share with it, the reality is that national law enforcement agencies remain wary of revealing too much.

As the role of mafia states has become clearer, law enforcement officers across the globe have begun to develop new policies and strategies for dealing with such states, including requiring high-level public officials to disclose their finances; scrutinizing the accountants, lawyers, and technology experts who protect crime lords; and improving coordination among different domestic agencies. The rise of mafia states has also added urgency to the search for ways to internationalize the fight against crime. One promising approach would be to create "coalitions of the honest" among law enforcement agencies that are less likely to have been penetrated or captured by criminal groups. Some states are already experimenting with arrangements of this kind, which go beyond normal bilateral anticrime cooperation by including not just law enforcement agencies but also representatives from intelligence agencies and armed forces. A complementary step would be to develop multinational networks of magistrates, judges, police officials, intelligence analysts, and policymakers to encourage a greater degree of cooperation than Interpol affords by building on the trust that exists among senior law enforcement officers who have fought transnational criminal networks together for decades. As is often the case, long-term collaborations among like-minded individuals who know one another well and share values are far more effective than formal, officially sanctioned cooperation between institutions whose officers barely know one another.

Unfortunately, despite the near-universal recognition that combating international crime requires international action, most anticrime initiatives remain primarily domestic. And although mafia states have transformed international crime into a national security issue, the responsibility for combating it still rests almost exclusively with law enforcement agencies. Indeed, even in developed countries, police departments and other law enforcement bodies rarely coordinate with their national security counterparts, even though transnational crime threatens democratic governance, financial markets, and human rights.

An important obstacle to combating the spread of mafia states is a basic lack of awareness among ordinary citizens and policymakers about the extent of the phenomenon. Ignorance of the scope and scale of the problem will make it difficult to defend or increase the already meager budgets of government agencies charged with confronting international crime, especially in a time of fiscal austerity. But such awareness will be hard to generate while so many aspects of the process of state criminalization remain ill understood -- and therein lies an even larger problem. Devoting public money to reducing the power of mafia states will be useless or even counterproductive unless the funds pay for policies grounded in a robust body of knowledge. Regrettably, the mafia state is a phenomenon about which there is little available data. The analytic frameworks that governments are currently applying to the problem are primitive, based on outdated understandings about organized crime. Addressing this dearth of knowledge will require law enforcement authorities, intelligence agencies, military organizations, media outlets, academics, and nongovernmental organizations to develop and share more reliable information. Doing so, however, would be only a first step -- and an admittedly insufficient one.

[https://foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-04-20/mafia-states]

 

“The most dangerous people in the world are not the tiny minority instigating evil acts, but those who do the acts for them. For example, when the British invaded India, many Indians accepted to work for the British to kill off Indians who resisted their occupation. So in other words, many Indians were hired to kill other Indians on behalf of the enemy for a paycheck. Today, we have mercenaries in Africa, corporate armies from the western world, and unemployed men throughout the Middle East killing their own people - and people of other nations - for a paycheck. To act without a conscience, but for a paycheck, makes anyone a dangerous animal. The devil would be powerless if he couldn't entice people to do his work. So as long as money continues to seduce the hungry, the hopeless, the broken, the greedy, and the needy, there will always be war between brothers.”
― Suzy Kassem

 

US Senators Frank Church and John Tower examine a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) poison dart gun that causes cancer and heart attacks, during the US Senate Select Committee’s investigation into the assassination plots on foreign leaders in 1975.

http://www.guardian.co.tt/lifestyle/2012-02-27/cancer-secret-weapon

 

External economies

The concepts of external economies and diseconomies (“externalities”) treat the subject of how the costs and benefits that constrain and motivate a decision maker in a particular activity may deviate from the costs or benefits that activity creates for a larger organization. Most of the economic literature on externalities has focused on the operation of an entire economic system, with particular reference to the effectiveness of prices, markets, competition, and profit motivation as regulators of production and consumption.

Economic theory suggests that a system characterized by private ownership of resources and sufficient competition will maximize total income and economic welfare. The system will establish an equilibrium in which product prices equal their costs on their respective margins of production. Costs include an opportunity rate of return on invested capital, which is an element of business accounting profit, and the rewards, or “rent,” that especially endowed resources may command. Production costs also reflect technological constraints, and producers employ the least costly method of producing any given output. A further characteristic of the equilibrium is that similar resources, including capital, obtain equal earnings or returns in all activities. If earnings were unequal, resources would enter more profitable activities and leave less lucrative ones until earnings equality comes about. The resulting allocation of resources is also consistent with consumers’ preferences. Finally, consumers’ demands, through their influence on market prices and hence profits, determine the allocation of resources.

The system works in such a way that the wide diffusion of decision making which is necessary if complex systems are to operate at all is permitted. Each decision maker only needs to have knowledge about the things he consumes, or produces, or his occupation. That individuals can so narrow their focus permits a division of labor and, in turn, the resulting gains of specialization. The vital mechanism (and social institution) that facilitates such specialization is the price system, or market organization. The price system is an “information system” that provides producers and consumers with the signals that guide their behavior. Hence, the economic system is highly interdependent: the combined behavior of individual decision makers spontaneously determines relative prices and quantities of items produced and consumed, while relative prices are the signals, constraints, and opportunities to which individual decision makers respond and adapt.

Such a general equilibrium system has two specific qualities: (1) Production costs of each item, on its respective margin of production, when viewed in a social cost sense, equal the price of each item. (2) The price of each end product accurately reflects the incremental satisfaction that consumers attach to it. These two qualities constitute a “social optimum” in that national income and economic welfare are maximized [see, however, WELFARE ECONOMICS]. Note that it is only optimal if the marginal social costs of each activity equal the social benefits they create. If the social cost of an activity exceeds the costs relevant to the decision makers in the activity, there is an external diseconomy. If the benefits of an activity exceed its marginal cost, there is an external economy.

Due to the extreme interdependence within an economy, the behavior of a given industry can increase the cost of other industries in ways which need not be socially undesirable. Some of these phenomena, too, have been associated with the subject of external economies and diseconomies. One of the difficulties in the evaluation of externalities is the problem of determining which are socially desirable or undesirable and should be promoted or counteracted by public policy measures and which do not warrant government interference with the private sector.

The subject of external economies and diseconomies thus treats possible mechanical shortcomings of an economy that cause individual decision makers to operate in a fashion that thwarts the full attainment of broad social objectives. To some students the possible wide extent of externalities is sufficient basis to justify extensive government intervention in the private sector of the economy. To other students this point is debatable. The resolution of these differences has been, and remains, a major unsettled issue in economics.

 

External diseconomies

Technical external diseconomies. Technical external diseconomies, sometimes called “nuisance effects,” were extensively discussed by A. C. Pigou ([1920] 1960, part 2, chapter 9). They arise from undesirable by-products of a production process. An example used by Pigou is the case of steam locomotives emitting sparks that cause fires. A farmer’s livestock that eats his neighbor’s crops is another example. Extensive lists of unwanted byproducts may be drawn up in modern societies– from air and water pollution to traffic congestion associated with the automobile.

Such unwanted by-products are a natural consequence of many production processes. They impose a cost upon society similar to the cost of productive resources necessary to produce the desired product. They create a social problem insofar as their cost may not be properly allocated between different segments of the economy.

Let us consider further Pigou’s example of spark-emitting steam locomotives. Assume that the marginal cost of employing resources to produce a ton-mile of railroad freight service may be 3 cents. The railroad system, however, “causes” 0.5 cents worth of damage per ton-mile because of fires inflicted on farmers’ crops adjoining the right-of-way. Whether such behavior creates an unwarranted social cost, and what the appropriate social policy should be to deal with it, pose some subtle and complex issues.

The main force of Pigou’s treatment of the subject is that the “social cost” of producing a ton-mile of freight is 3.5 cents (3 cents for the railroad’s own costs, plus 0.5 cents for the destroyed crops). The policy prescription is that the railroad should be made to pay farmers for their destroyed crops or that railroads should be taxed or restrained in other ways that will prevent damage.

Coase (1960) has demonstrated, however, that this traditional approach to “nuisance effects” is wrong. The relationship is reciprocal. Crop damage is “caused” just as much by the farmer’s growing crops along the railroad’s right-of-way as by locomotives emitting sparks (indeed, the doctrine of “causation” is spurious). Moreover, to restrain railroads in arbitrary ways may impose a greater social loss (due to higher-cost railroad services) than the loss of some crops. The proper solution is to design a system that maximizes the economy’s total product.

Such a solution might be found by recognizing that in producing the crops associated with the 0.5 cents per ton-mile of damage, farmers must purchase resources worth, say, 0.4 cents. Under these conditions, the railroad could pay farmers 0.1 cent not to grow crops along its right-of-way. Farmers would be just as well off as if there were no railroad; freight costs would be 3.1 cents per ton-mile, instead of 3.5 cents if farmers were arbitrarily awarded “full” damages; and 0.4 cents worth of resources would be freed to produce other products. Indeed, this kind of solution is often worked out spontaneously by bargaining between the concerned parties or is brought about through legal adjudication.

The social problems associated with external “nuisance effects” arise when certain scarce resources are treated as if they were “free goods”- because of faulty specification of property rights, or because it is difficult to identify in some quantitative way who causes the nuisance or who suffers from it (or both), or because the administrative costs of “solving” the problem may be more costly than the nuisance itself. Many students suggest that activities imposing unregistered social costs upon society be subjected to special excise taxes; however, the precise design of excise taxes that would not themselves distort resource allocation is difficult. Other students urge extensive state regulation. However, a distressing number of nuisance effects are due to activities that are already either regulated or managed by the state, for example, highway systems and government-owned public utilities, suggesting that effective solutions may not be easily attained from that quarter.

Sweeping solutions to the nuisance effect problem do not appear readily available. Thus far in virtually all social systems they have been coped with on an ad hoc basis. Perhaps one of the best ways to achieve better social guidelines for treatment of these problems is for economists to give more attention to the precise content of property rights, in terms of their economic effects, and for lawyers to employ economic analysis to evaluate the social utility of legal principles applied to torts.

[www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciences-magazines/external-economies-and-diseconomies]

 

Crimes against humanity are certain acts that are deliberately committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack or individual attack directed against any civilian or an identifiable part of a civilian population. The first prosecution for crimes against humanity took place at the Nuremberg trials. Crimes against humanity have since been prosecuted by other international courts – such as the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court, as well as in domestic prosecutions. The law of crimes against humanity has primarily developed through the evolution of customary international law. Crimes against humanity are not codified in an international convention, although there is currently an international effort to establish such a treaty, led by the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative.

Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity can be committed during peace or war.[1] They are not isolated or sporadic events, but are part either of a government policy (although the perpetrators need not identify themselves with this policy) or of a wide practice of atrocities tolerated or condoned by a government or a de facto authority. War crimes,murder, massacres, dehumanization, genocide, ethnic cleansing, unethical human experimentation, extrajudicial punishments, use of WMDs, state terrorism or state funding of terrorism, death squads, kidnappings and forced disappearances, military use of children, unjust imprisonment, enslavement, cannibalism, torture, rape, and political, racial, or religious repression may reach the threshold of crimes against humanity if they are part of a widespread or systematic practice.

Apartheid

The systematic persecution of one racial group by another, such as occurred during the South African apartheidgovernment, was recognized as a crime against humanity by the United Nations General Assembly in 1976.[15] The Charter of the United Nations (Article 13, 14, 15) makes actions of the General Assembly advisory to the Security Council.[16] In regard to apartheid in particular, the UN General Assembly has not made any findings, nor have apartheid-related trials for crimes against humanity been conducted.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimes_against_humanity]

 

 

ΤΙ ΚΑΤΕΓΡΑΨΕ ΒΡΕΤΑΝΙΚΗ ΕΡΕΥΝΑ ΤΟΥ 1974 ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΙΔΙΟΚΤΗΣΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΓΗΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΚΥΠΡΟ

16 Ιουλίου 2017

«ΔΕΝ ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙ Η ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΗ ΑΜΦΙΒΟΛΙΑ ΠΩΣ ΟΙ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΚΟΙ ΙΣΧΥΡΙΣΜΟΙ ΟΤΙ ΟΙ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΚΥΠΡΙΟΙ ΚΑΤΕΧΟΥΝ 30% ΤΗΣ ΓΗΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΚΥΠΡΟ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΑΒΑΣΙΜΟΙ», ΕΓΡΑΦΑΝ ΟΙ ΒΡΕΤΑΝΟΙ ΤΟΝ ΣΕΠΤΕΜΒΡΙΟ ΤΟΥ 1974

Η έρευνα του 1946 έδειχνε ότι, στο σύνολο, 79.9% ανήκε στους Ελληνοκυπρίους, 18.3% ανήκε στους Τουρκοκυπρίους και 1.8% σε Μαρωνίτες, Βρετανούς και άλλους. Η δε έρευνα για το 1960 έδειξε ότι το 20.4% καλλιεργήσιμης γης ανήκε σε Τουρκοκυπρίους, 78.3% σε Ελληνοκυπρίους και 1.3% σε άλλους

Τον Σεπτέμβριο του 1974, μετά τις δύο τουρκικές εισβολές και την κατοχή της μισής Κύπρου, η Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία δημοσίευσε στοιχεία για τα πραγματικά ποσοστά ιδιοκτησίας γης σε όλη την Κύπρο. Τα στοιχεία αυτά μελέτησαν οι αξιωματούχοι της Βρετανικής Υπάτης Αρμοστείας στη Λευκωσία τον Αύγουστο του 1975, που επισκέφθηκαν το Κτηματολόγιο, και τα έστειλαν μαζί με τα σχόλιά τους στο Φόρεϊν Όφις, το οποίο μελετούσε τότε διάφορα σενάρια “λύσης” δι-κοινοτικής, δι-ζωνικής ομοσπονδίας, με αναπροσαρμογές “συνόρων”, καθώς η κατοχική Τουρκία είχε περάσει με τις δύο εισβολές στην κατοχή της το 34% του εδάφους της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας και απαιτούσε (όπως απαιτεί μέχρι σήμερα) αναγνώριση ξεχωριστού “κράτους”.

Στην πολυσέλιδη και λεπτομερέστατη στα αγγλικά έκθεσή του το Κτηματολόγιο της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, τον Σεπτέμβριο του 1974 ( Prepared by the Lands and Surveys Department Nicosia – Cyprus) έγραψε μεταξύ άλλων : “Δεν υπάρχει η ελάχιστη αμφιβολία πως οι τουρκικοί ισχυρισμοί ότι οι Τουρκοκύπριοι κατέχουν 30% της γης στην Κύπρο είναι αβάσιμοι. Τα πραγματικά και αδιαμφισβήτητα γεγονότα είναι ότι η τουρκοκυπριακή ιδιοκτησία γης είναι 12.3% σ΄όλη την Κύπρο, η δε ελληνοκυπριακή ιδιοκτησία είναι 61% και το 26.7% γης δεν ανήκει σε ιδιώτες.. οποιεσδήποτε διεκδικήσεις ή ισχυρισμοί από τους Τούρκους για μεγαλύτερο ποσοστό γης δεν μπορεί να υποστηριχτεί με κανένα τρόπο εκτός και αν οι Τούρκοι πετάξουν όλες τις προσποιήσεις τους και πουν καθαρά ότι ο τουρκικός στρατός εισέβαλε στην Κύπρο με τον μοναδικό στόχο να ενώσει τα κατεχόμενα με την Τουρκία και να επεκτείνει τα τουρκικά εδάφη…”

Η Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία μάλιστα τότε, έδωσε στην δημοσιότητα και τις στατιστικές που είχαν κάνει οι αποικιακές αρχές το 1946 και 1960 και οι οποίες είχαν γίνει με την επίβλεψη του Βρετανού ειδικού κ. Percival, βοηθός του οποίου ήταν ο Τουρκοκύπριος A. P. Djelaletin, με στόχο να καταγραφόταν η ιδιοκτησία της καλλιεργήσιμης γης (Ελληνοκυπρίων και Τουρκοκυπρίων).

Η έρευνα του 1946 έδειχνε ότι σε σύνολο το 79.9% ανήκε στους Ελληνοκύπριους και 18.3% ανήκε στους Τουρκοκύπριους και 1.8% σε Μαρωνίτες, Βρετανούς και άλλους. Η δε έρευνα για το 1960 έδειξε ότι το 20.4% καλλιεργήσιμης γης ανήκε σε Τουρκοκύπριους, 78.3% σε Ελληνοκύπριους και 1.3% σε άλλους.

Σύμφωνα με το Τμήμα Στατιστικής της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας λοιπόν, και στη βάση της στατιστικής που ετοιμάστηκε από το Κτηματολόγιο τον Σεπτέμβριο του 1974 τα ποσοστά σε ιδιοκτησίας γης των Τουρκοκυπρίων σ΄ολόκληρη την Κύπρο ήταν 12.3%.

Δύο αξιωματούχοι της Βρετανικής Υπάτης Αρμοστείας τον Αύγουστο του 1975 και μετά από μια δημοσίευση στην αγγλόφωνη Cyprus Mail και μια επιστολή που έδιδε την στατιστική για την ιδιοκτησία γης, επισκέφθηκαν τον επικεφαλής του Κτηματολογίου Λευκωσίας (τότε κ. Ιερωνυμίδη) για να λάβουν το λόγο για τις πληροφορίες που είχε δώσει στην δημοσιότητα η Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία. Αφού είδαν και άκουσαν, στις 12 Αυγούστου 1975 ενημέρωσαν την αξιωματούχο στο Φόρειν ΄Οφις δίδα Mauve Fort που ήταν άμεσα αναμεμειγμένη με το Κυπριακό και στην παρασκηνιακή ετοιμασία χαρτών με πιθανά σενάρια αναπροσαρμογής συνόρων για ‘δύο διζωνικές’ περιοχές. Βολιδοσκοπώντας και τους Τούρκους ως προς τι μπορούσαν να επιστρέψουν (που δεν επέστρεφαν τίποτα). Από τότε οι Βρετανοί πιθανολογούσαν ότι δεν θα επέστρεφαν την Μόρφου και ίσως ένα μικρό κομμάτι της, όπως ακριβώς λέχθηκε πρόσφατα στην Ελβετία. Έγραφε λοιπόν η αναφορά των αξιωματούχων της Βρετανικής ΄Υπ. Αρμοστείας :

“… Οι Τουρκοκύπριοι για να δικαιολογήσουν το πέραν του 30% της γης ισχυρίζονται ότι αυτό το ποσοστό αντιπροσωπεύει την ιδιοκτησία γης τους. Οι Ελληνοκύπριοι από την πλευρά τους γρήγορα απέρριψαν τους ισχυρισμούς αυτούς. Εφοδιασμένοι με την τελευταία έκδοση της Cyprus Mail και μια επιστολή με την ελληνική στατιστική, ο Geoffrey Stephens και εγώ πήγαμε χθες και είδαμε τον Διευθυντή του Κτηματολογίου. Μας έδωσε τα επισυναπτόμενα έγγραφα, τα οποία και παρόλο ότι εκδόθηκαν για προπαγανδιστικούς σκοπούς για να αντικρούσουν τους τουρκικούς ισχυρισμούς, εντούτοις φαίνονται αρκετά πειστικά. ΄Όπως θα δείτε, το συμπέρασμα είναι ότι μόνο το 12.3% της Κύπρου (της νήσου όχι της Δημοκρατίας) ανήκε στους Τουρκοκύπριους το 1974, και αν ένας προσθέσει και το ποσοστό από το 26.7% της Κύπρου που δεν ανήκει σε ιδιώτες, οι Τούρκοι μπορούν να ισχυριστούν ότι έχουν το 16.8% της όλης νήσου… ΄Ηταν ξεκάθαρο σε μας ότι τα αρχεία του Τμήματος Κτηματολογίου διατηρούνται με μεγάλη σχολαστικότητα… και είναι επομένως δύσκολο να αμφισβητούνται τα αποτελέσματα της Ελληνοκυπριακής στατιστικής και πραγματικά δεν μας φαίνονται παράλογα δεδομένης της έκτασης που οι Ελληνοκύπριοι αγόραζαν γη τα χρόνια πριν το 1974. (Σ΄αυτό περιλαμβάνεται και η ιδιοκτησία της Εκκλησίας και του Evkaf). Εν πάση περιπτώσει οι Τουρκοκύπριοι έχουν στήσει το δικό τους Κτηματολόγιο και αναμφίβολα θα ετοιμάσουν τους δικούς τους ισχυρισμούς. Θα τους επισκεφθούμε…” Την επιστολή υπόγραψε ο κ. M. Elliott.

Στις 19 Αυγούστου 1975 ο κ. M. J. Pawley της Αρμοστείας με δική του επιστολή ενημέρωσε και αυτός την δίδα Fort και για την επίσκεψή τους στο “κτηματολόγιο” των κατεχομένων και αφού είδαν τον εκεί υπεύθυνο κ. Esat Fellahoglu έγραψε:

“… Ο αριθμός του 30.4% έρχεται από το Evkaf το οποίο λέγεται ότι κρατά στοιχεία της τουρκικής ιδιοκτησίας… ο κ. Esat Fellahoglu μου είπε ότι το τμήμα του έχει στοιχεία για την Κερύνεια και Αμμόχωστο και μέρος της Λευκωσίας μόνο, επομένως είναι αδύνατον να δοθεί στατιστική για την τουρκοκυπριακή ιδιοκτησία… Οι Τούρκοι στην προπαγάνδα τους είναι συνήθως αόριστοι για την ιδιοκτησία γης… ”

 

Το κτηματολόγιο της Κύπρου ιδρύθηκε από την αποικιακή διοίκηση, το οποίο ξεκίνησε να καταγράφει τις περιουσίες το 1909 και ολοκλήρωσε τις εργασίες του το 1929. ΄Εκτοτε, όπως επεσήμανε στην πολυσέλιδη έκθεσή του το 1974 το Κτηματολόγιο Κύπρου, τα αρχεία διατηρούνταν στην εντέλεια και προσβάσιμα σε όποιον ήθελε να τα επιθεωρήσει.

Για 43 χρόνια από τις δύο τουρκικές βάρβαρες εισβολές και συνεχιζόμενη κατοχή της γης και περιουσιών μας, τόσο οι Τούρκοι και Τουρκοκύπριοι επιμένουν στην αναγνώριση ‘κράτους’ τους με την βρετανο-τουρκική δι-κοινοτική, δι-ζωνική ομοσπονδία κτισμένο στη κλεμμένη γη μας όσο και δικοί μας με την επιμονή τους στην ίδια βρετανο-τουρκική ρατσιστική ΔΔΟ επιμένουν και ‘αγωνίζονται’ ουσιαστικά και εκείνοι στο να ικανοποιήσουν τους Τούρκους και Τουρκοκύπριους προσφέροντάς τους νομιμοποίηση των τετελεσμένων δύο τουρκικών εισβολών!

[http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/politics/443986/monon-to-123-anikei-stous-tk]

 

I keep reservations about the accuracy of the information which is contained in the next one article titled "CIA supplies ISIS with an airforce with help from Khazarian Mafia, Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey and Israel". Christos Boumpoulis.

 

CIA supplies ISIS with an airforce with help from Khazarian Mafia, Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey and Israel

 

We know that ISIS has recently been heavily re-armed, re-equipped and re-inforced, now they are getting their own airforce, courtesy of the CIA

VT has stumbled across the CIA’s secret false flag airforce, composed of stolen MiGs and used to attack hospitals and refugee camps from inside Israel and Turkey.

Back in March this year, we reported on a rather shady deal between Croatia and Ukraine where a dozen MiG-21s disappeared. Croatia sent 7 MiG-21s to Ukraine to be refurbished, they were supposed to receive those 7 after refurbishment plus another 5 refurbished to the same standard. What the Croats got was rather different – piles of worn out junk that looked like MiGs but were useless, unable to fly. The Croats investigated and discovered the scam – these were not the MiGs they had sent for refurbishment, they were fakes cobbled together from junk parts taken from scrapped aircraft. One plane had a Bulgarian fuselage, Algerian wings and old fuel tanks from the former Soviet Union.

Which begs the question – what happened to Croatia’s MiGs? They were indeed refurbished in Ukraine but the Croats never saw them again, instead, they were sold on to another customer – the Russian Mafia.

What would the Russian Mafia want with a dozen refurbished MiG-21s? First, we need to recognise who the Russian Mafia actually are – they are 100% Jewish, the direct descendants of the Khazars. The Khazars inhabited what is now southern Ukraine and one of the main cities of their empire was Odessa, the port on the Black Sea that today is Ukraine’s major port. Odessa today is ruled by former president of Georgia, international arms trafficker and close friend of Israel, Mikhail Saakashvili.

Saakashvili was made governor of Odessa in order to oversee a massive smuggling operation that is keeping Islamic State well supplied with weapons, munitions and all the other necessary goods to wage war. The route to ISIS is across the Black Sea to the port of Batumi, which sits just a few miles north of the Georgian-Turkish border. From Batumi, the supplies are trucked into Turkey and then onto IS in the south. This is the fate of that dozen missing MiG-21s – they were crated and shipped from Odessa to Batumi then trucked down to Incirlik air base in southern Turkey.

But why would the CIA and their Saudi allies supply their IS proxy army with refurbished half a century old MiG-21s when they have the money and connections to source just about any state of the art hardware their hearts may desire?

This is where the deception part of the operation comes into play – the Syrian air force is still operating MiG-21s, therefore it is a simple matter to paint those dozen IS MiGs in Syrian colours and have them impersonate the Syrian air force for nefarious purposes.

Just imagine the scenarios for false flag mayhem that these dozen ‘Syrian’ MiGs enable; if the mainstream media reports that the Syrians have bombed a civilian target, say a Medecins Sans Frontier hospital or a Red Crescent refugee camp, rest assured, it will be the work of the CIA’s phony ‘Syrian’ airforce. Even worse, imagine the hullaballoo that could be kicked up by the mainstream media, the accusations of Assad’s cruelty and inhumanity – it would be the ‘barrel bombs dropped on civilians’ nonsense all over again but this time the ‘evidence’ to prove it happened could be furnished to the media by the CIA in the form of video footage clearly showing ‘Syrian’ MiGs carrying out the attacks.

The Syrian war, far from approaching anything remotely resembling an end phase, as perhaps appeared possible just a few short months ago before the supposed ceasefire, is now becoming an ever more dangerous and intense conflict, not least because the ceasefire allowed IS to re-stock it’s weapons, munitions and supplies, to reorder it’s forces, incorporating fresh reinforcements and emerge a more dangerous force than they ever were before the ceasefire.

These are very worrying times indeed, especially so from the perspective of the Syrian people who continue to endure the harsh conditions imposed by more than 6 years of war, frequently without electricity or potable water supplies but remaining steadfast in their determination not to give in to the terrorists and militants that plague their nation. We salute their determination but remain conscious of the limits of endurance and continue to work towards ending this awful war.

[http://www.veteranstoday.com/2016/07/14/cia-supplies-isis-with-an-airforce-with-help-from-khazarian-mafia-ukraine-georgia-turkey-and-israel/]

 

Russian Mafia's Worldwide Grip

Brooklyn's Brighton Beach neighborhood has earned the nicknamed "Little Odessa" because it reminds its thousands of Russian immigrant residents of the Black Sea resort back home.

But while it is home to many law-abiding citizens looking a better life, Little Odessa is also ground zero for the Russian Mafia in the United States.

When most people think of organized crime, CBS News Correspondent Bill Plante reports, it calls to mind images of The Godfather or The Sopranos—in other words, the Italian Mafia.

But in less than 30 years, Russian organized crime has grown to pose a threat law enforcement officials think could be greater than that posed by La Cosa Nostra.

"Italian organized crime in America is a pimple on a horse's ass compared with Russian organized crime in America—and globally,"says Robert I. Friedman, author of a new book on the Russian Mafia.

The reason for the Russian Mafia's dominance, says Friedman, is that they "have something no crime group in the world has. They have their own state to work from, in fact, a former superpower."

Currently, Russian mobsters are operating in 50 countries.

Friedman says Russian organized crime emerged here during the 1970s era of détente with the former Soviet Union.

Under pressure from the Nixon administration, Moscow agreed to allow more Soviet Jews to emigrate. But in a move copied years later by Fidel Castro, the Soviets opened prison doors in the gulag and thousands of hard-core criminals left for the United States.

Since then, the Russian Mafia has been linked to penny stock manipulation, gas excise tax scams, health care fraud and cybercrime—criminal enterprises where they are pioneers, not just perpetrators.

But law enforcement officials say the Russians are particularly good at money laundering, the lifeblood of organized crime. In fact, other crime groups use the Russians to clean their dirty money.

From the Valentine's Day Massacre to Murder, Inc., organized crime in America already has a blooy history. But Friedman says the Russians are even more ruthless than the mobsters who preceded them.

"Italian organized crime has an unwritten rule that they don't go after cops. They don't go after prosecutors. They don't go after American journalists," the author says. "The Russians go after everybody. One retired cop in New York told me, 'They'll shoot you just to see if their gun works.'"

One of the Russian Mafia's most notorious members is Vyacheslav Ivankov, who wears eight-pointed star tattoos on his chest to show that he belongs to the highest rank of the Russian underworld.

Reputed to be the godfather of the Russian mob in this country, he is currently serving a nine-and-half-year prison term for extortion.

"He was kicked out of Russia by the ruling council of mobsters because he was killing so many people," says Friedman. Ivankov was one of the first Russian mobsters to alert American law enforcement to the criminal threat coming out of the former Soviet Union.

Prosecutors say he ran a criminal network that stretched clear across the country.

The worldwide reach of the Russian mob was demonstrated by Ludwig Fainberg, a.k.a. "Tarzan." according to Friedman, the nightclub owner arranged the sale of a Russian submarine, complete with a captain and crew, to Colombian drug runners.

He was arrested before the sale took place, but if the deal had gone through, it would have given the Colombians huge, new smuggling capability: the means to bring 40 tons of cocaine to points up and down the North American Pacific coast.

Like the Italians and Russians, many immigrant groups became involved in organized crime when they first came to America. Irish, Jewish, Chinese and Albanian are just a few. Friedman warns that the Russian Mafia is ready to enter the next stage of criminal development.

"What the Italians were able to do was to get into labor unions, to get into legitimate industries to use their money to corrupt major politicians, cops, prosecutors—sometimes even fix political races," he explains.

"The Russians aren't there yet in America," the author says. "But they'll learn. They'll learn very quickly."

[http://www.cbsnews.com/news/russian-mafias-worldwide-grip/]

 

 

Τελευταία Ενημέρωση στις Κυριακή, 23 Ιούλιος 2017 19:59